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History without Time




While “natural history” is practically synonymous with the name of Buffon, the term itself
has been otherwise overlooked by historians of science. This essay attempts to address this
omission by investigating the meanings of “physique,” “natural philosophy,” and “his-
tory,” among other terms, with the purpose of understanding Buffon’s actual objectives.
It also shows that Buffon never claimed to be a Newtonian and should not be considered
as such; the goal is to provide a historical analysis that resituates Buffon’s thought within
his own era. This is done, primarily, by eschewing the often-studied question of time in
Buffon. Instead, this study examines the nontemporal meanings of the word “history”
within the naturalist’s theory and method. The title of his Natural History is examined
both as an indicator of the kind of science that Buffon was hoping to achieve and as a
source of great misinterpretation among his peers. Unlike Buffon, many of his contem-
poraries actually envisioned the study of nature from a Baconian perspective where
history was restricted to the mere collection of facts and where philosophy, which was the
implicit and ultimate goal of studying nature, was seen, at least for the present, as
unrealizable. Buffon confronts this tendency insofar as his Histoire naturelle claims to be
the real physique that, along with describing nature, also sought to identify general laws
and provide clear insight into what true knowledge of nature is or should be. According
to Buffon, history (both natural and civil) is not analogous to mathematics; it is a
nonmathematical method whose scope encompasses both nature and society. This meth-
odological stance gives rise to the “physicization” of certain moral concepts—a gesture
that was interpreted by his contemporaries as Epicurean and atheist. In addition, Buffon
reduces a number of metaphysically tainted historical concepts (e.g., antediluvian mon-
uments) to objects of physical analysis, thereby confronting the very foundation of natural
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theology. In Buffon, as this essay makes clear, natural history is paving the way for a new
physique (science of natural beings), independent from mathematics and from God, that
treats naturalia in a philosophical and “historical” manner that is not necessarily “tem-
poral.”
W HAT WAS NATURAL HISTORY and how was it to be understood in its eighteenth-century context? Most of the time “natural history” was understood as the science of
“naturalia”—that is, the study of the three kingdoms of nature (mineral, vegetable,
animal). Georges-Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon, and his momumental Histoire naturelle
(thirty-six volumes published between 1749 and 1789) are generally seen as synonymous
with such a project. (See Figure 1.) In his Prospectus for the Histoire naturelle, published
in 1748, Buffon implicitly endorsed this view: in theory, the Histoire naturelle was
supposed to amount to no more than a description of the Cabinet du Roi, the complete
scope of which was intended to run to nine volumes for the animal world, three for the
plant world, and three for the mineral world. Buffon, of course, was sorely mistaken in his
estimates. His first fifteen volumes, far from encompassing the totality of nature, went no
further than the mico, a little monkey. Birds soon followed, filling another nine volumes
(1770–1783); the mineral world required five volumes of its own (1783–1788), which
were published concurrently with the seven volumes of Supple´ments to the first series
(1774–1789).1 But plants, insects, fish, and reptiles—to name but a few of the most
conspicuous absences—remained out of reach for the Histoire naturelle, even though
Buffon, working with many collaborators, dedicated his entire life to this project (the last
volume was published posthumously). At the turn of the century, naturalists such as
Bernard Germain E´ tienne Laville, comte de Lace´pe`de (1756–1825), published “follow-
ups” to Buffon (Suites a` Buffon) to complete the grand tableau. Seen from this perspec-
tive, and taking into consideration that Buffon et alia sought to describe and identify the
totality of nature along with the laws of natural processes, natural history could easily be
taken for an ancestral form of biology, on the path toward its scientific form. The
Bachelardian account of the life sciences accurately reflects this reality: to a certain extent,
natural history was a kind of biology not yet entirely “purified” from the prejudices and
errors of common opinion.2
To see natural history as a precursor to biological science is to confuse the real meaning
of the word “science,” however. In the eighteenth century, “science” was often used in the
plural—“sciences” (as in Acade´mie des Sciences)—but in its singular form “science” was
used to designate a complete body of knowledge. Another confusing word is the term
“philosophie,” which was broadly understood to mean the complete system of knowledge
that traditionally consisted of four parts: logic, metaphysics, physique, and ethics.
1 Georges-Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon, Histoire naturelle, 36 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1749–
1789), Vols. 1–15: Histoire naturelle, ge´ne´rale et particulie`re (1749–1767); Vols. 16–24: Histoire naturelle des
oiseaux (1770–1783); Vols. 25–29: Histoire naturelle des mine´raux (1783–1788); Vols. 30–36: Supple´ments a`
l’Histoire naturelle (1774–1789). Citations to the Histoire naturelle in this essay will use the overall volume
numbers; the year of publication will be given the first time a volume is cited. All texts are available at
www.buffon.cnrs.fr.
2 Gaston Bachelard, La formation de l’esprit scientifique: Contribution a` une psychanalyse de la connaissance
objective (1938), 14th ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1989), p. 45: “Buffon’s Histoire naturelle could be reread with a more
critical eye, observing the observer, adopting the attitude of a shrink in search of unreasoned reasons. It will then
appear that the portrayals of the animals are structured by a false biological hierarchy, and are pervaded by the
unconscious fantasy of the narrator.”
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It is difficult to locate the place of natural history in the academic divisions of the
eighteenth century. One can claim that natural history was already biological science in
the making—but then where was this science to be found? Was it in the Jardin du Roi,
founded in 1635 and largely devoted to the cultivation of medicinal plants? Or in the
Acade´mie Royale des Sciences, founded in 1666, where no section for “natural history”
existed before 1785? Or in the Socie´te´ Royale d’Agriculture de la Ge´ne´ralite´ de Paris,
which was founded in 1761 but had no national standing until 1788? In short, there was
no academy for natural history but, rather, several rival institutions, all treating the question of
natural entities. So when the young Buffon, not yet a count but already the Intendant of
the Jardin du Roi (a position he obtained when only thirty-two), published the first three
Figure 1. Portrait of Buffon (1761) by Franc¸ois-Hubert Drouais (1725–1775). © Muse´e Buffon,
Montbard. Georges-Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon (1707–1799), was a man of power. Although he
devoted most of his life to writing and publishing the thirty-six volumes of his Histoire naturelle, he
is often considered a popularizer of science. D’Alembert calls him “the great phrasemonger” (“le
grand phrasier”), and Condorcet depicts him as a pompous poseur—“il mettait ses manchettes
pour e´crire”—a sentence taken up by Cuvier and by Flaubert in his Dictionnaire des ide´es rec¸ues.
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volumes of his Histoire naturelle, ge´ne´rale et particulie`re, in September 1749, it aroused
great curiosity and even enthusiasm. Yet the book also disappointed its public.
Scholarship on Buffon has understood his conception of natural history in different
ways. One influential thesis, dating at least to Samuel Butler’s Evolution, Old and New,
weaves a teleological narrative that casts Buffon as a figurehead leading to Darwin. This
link is based on Buffon’s alleged contribution to the “discovery of time,” or, at least, his
insertion of time into today’s conception of nature.3 Pre-Darwinian or not, his Natural
History has been understood as a temporal or dynamic history of nature. Not only does this
interpretation seem anachronistic to me, but it conceals the methodological struggles
separating historians, both civil and natural, from mathematicians.
More recently, from the perspective of the history of collections and scientific institu-
tions, Buffon’s work has been taken up as an example of a Latourian “center of accu-
mulation.” One can study his institutional position, his various sources, and the way he
used the French colonies to establish an extended network of correspondents and infor-
mants. A third approach, linked to the second, would analyze Buffon in terms of the
“cultures of natural history.” From this point of view, Buffon’s natural history is not only
a theoretical endeavor or a contribution to the theory of generation: its mission overlaps
with the production of the collection of naturalia held at the Cabinet du Roi. In other
words, Buffon’s work should be related to his “material practices,” but also to some
rhetorical models. These concepts have renewed and energized the whole scholarly
approach to eighteenth-century natural history.
My point here is not to challenge such approaches, but my methodology and aims are
different. I take a more traditional stance, working from the perspective of history of ideas
but leaving aside much of the “whiggish” obsession with time. I believe that the words that
were used by Buffon’s contemporaries had an impact in intellectual debates. Names,
especially when it comes to the names given to sciences by their practitioners, are not
incidental: they function as flags or standards and they provide the guidelines for many
discussions. This is why a re-examination of the term “histoire naturelle” seems so
crucial, for Buffon indeed played with this concept—and, to a large degree, cheated. As
we will see, the naturalist was merely expected to describe a collection; from such a
perspective, “histoire naturelle” would seem a perfectly appropriate tag for his enterprise.
But given the actual telos of his work, what Buffon meant by “natural history” was closer
to the old Aristotelian “physique.”4 There again, however, Buffon’s controversial claim
3 Samuel Butler, Evolution, Old and New; or, The Theories of Buffon, Dr. Erasmus Darwin, and Lamarck, as
Compared with That of Mr. Charles Darwin (London: Hardwicke & Bogue, 1879). The first attempt to eradicate
what we might, following Joseph Clark, call this “precursitis virus” was J. S. Wilkie, “The Idea of Evolution in
the Writings of Buffon,” Annals of Science, 1956, 12:48–62, 212–227, 255–266; the phrase itself comes from
Joseph T. Clark, “The Philosophy of Science and the History of Science,” in Critical Problems in the History
of Science, ed. Marshall Clagett (Madison: Univ. Wisconsin Press, 1959), pp. 103–140, on p. 103. Regarding the
“discovery of time” see June Goodfield and Stephen Toulmin, The Discovery of Time (London: Hutchinson,
1965). Martin Rudwick refused to attribute the discovery of time to any “dead white male.” Nevertheless, he
devoted a section to “Buffon’s cooling globe”: Martin J. S. Rudwick, Bursting the Limits of Time: The
Reconstruction of Geohistory in the Age of Revolution (Chicago/London: Univ. Chicago Press, 2005), pp.
139–150.
4 I use “physique” (Buffon’s term) in the general sense of “the science of all natural beings,” rather than
“physics,” which has a more restricted sense of “science of the laws of matter” (not necessarily including the
organic realm). Besides, since there is no distinction between “physique” and “physics” in the French language,
it doesn’t help us to understand what Buffon had in mind. Likewise, the term “natural philosophy”—though it
is commonly used in English—has also seemed inappropriate here, since “philosophe naturel” is not usual in
French. Besides, one of the central aims of this essay is to clarifiy the relationship between history and
philosophy.
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against mathematical physique has to be explained: for if Buffon himself is expected to be
a Newtonian, his physique should be mathematical.
To recover many of these debates, this essay examines the reactions of Buffon’s
contemporaries to what was considered a polemical use of the concept of natural history.
Moreover, my analysis will interrogate the question of his supposed Epicureanism in an
attempt to identify the epistemological meaning and implications of the terms “history,”
“philosophy,” and “physique,” as they were understood as controversial labels for a
knowledge of natural things.
MISLEADING TITLE?
Buffon’s Natural History was not recognized as a natural history. Its first readers and
reviewers felt that they had been deceived by the title. Guillaume-Thomas Raynal
(1713–1796) wrote in his Nouvelles litte´raires for the year 1749: “All well considered, this
book does not correspond to our expectations.” Among the naturalists, Joseph-Adrien
Lelarge de Lignac (1710–1762), a metaphysician who worked with Rene´-Antoine Fer-
chault de Re´aumur (1683–1757), also emphasized that there was a deep misunderstanding
about the book’s subject:
You are waiting impatiently, Monsieur, for the history of the King’s Cabinet. You were
expecting to read an ordered catalogue of all the wealth that Nature is spreading with profusion
across the universe. This Cabinet is indeed a natural history of the kind you like. But you will
not have its description, because that has not been published: we only have the preface of it,
in three volumes in-4°, and this preface contains the philosophical fancies of M. de Buffon,
together with some anatomical pieces, added by M. Daubenton, in order to complete the third
volume.5
Scholars and amateurs of natural history were disappointed by Buffon’s work. Instead of
a thorough and accurate description of the Cabinet du Roi, they found what they called
“the philosophical fancies” of the Intendant of the Jardin du Roi.
For eighteenth-century readers, this disappointment stemmed from a discrepancy be-
tween the title and the content. This poses the question: Why did Buffon call his book
Natural History if what he intended to do did not relate at all to what was understood by
this title? The question is even more puzzling given that, as we know, he chose his title
deliberately, writing to Jean Jalabert that he had finally decided to publish, not a “Cata-
logue du Cabinet du Roi,” but a general “Natural History.”6
The use of the short title Natural History was very common. It could allude to
Aristotle’s History of Animals or, par excellence, to Pliny’s Historia naturalis, which
presented a “universal history” and opened with a general description of the universe.7
5 Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, Correspondance litte´raire, philosophique et critique, par Grimm, Diderot,
Raynal, Meister, ed. Maurice Tourneux, 16 vols. (Paris: Garnier, 1877–1882), Vol. 1, p. 337; and Joseph Adrien
Lelarge de Lignac, Lettres a` un Ame´riquain sur l’Histoire naturelle, ge´ne´rale et particulie`re de monsieur de
Buffon, 5 vols. (Hamburg, 1751), first letter, Vol. 1, pp. 1–2. See also the letter of Charles Secondat, baron de
la Bre`de et de Montesquieu, to Monseigneur Cerati: “M. de Buffon just published three volumes, which are to
be followed by twelve others: the first three volumes contain the general ideas.” Quoted in Pierre-Marie-Jean
Flourens, Buffon, Histoire de ses travaux et de ses ide´es (1844), 2nd ed. (Paris: Hachette, 1850), p. 283.
6 Georges-Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon, to Jean Jalabert, 2 Aug. 1745, quoted in Buffon, Oeuvres
philosophiques, ed. Jean Piveteau and Maurice Fre´chet (Corpus Ge´ne´ral des Philosophes Franc¸ais: Auteurs
Modernes, 41[1]) (Paris: Presses Univ. France, 1954), p. viii.
7 Pliny’s first word, significantly, was “world” (“mundus”). The book had been translated into English as
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According to the Plinian model, anyone who wrote a book bearing the title Natural
History would have to consider the subject on a grand scale. This is precisely what Buffon
did: he gave an account of the origin of the earth and all the other planets of the solar
system, showing that they were somehow torn off as chunks, flung out of the sun by an
errant comet’s collision. This opening contrasted sharply with that of Abbe´ Pluche’s
best-selling work, the Spectacle de la nature.8 The Spectacle aimed to demonstrate the
conformity between modern physique and the teachings of Moses for a wide popular audience.
It started with a consideration of insect generation, discarding the idea of the spontaneous
generation of vermin, and comparing, like Robert Hooke’s Micrographia, the perfection
of a bee’s stinger with the uneven surface of a manufactured needle. The difference
between the Spectacle and the Histoire naturelle highlighted two different ways to begin
an account of natural history. Buffon started with “les choses en grand,” whereas Pluche,
in the spirit of traditional natural theology, gave priority to the wonders of the microworld.
And, in fact, if Pluche fit perfectly well within the contemporary theological framework,
Buffon’s starting point would often be declared atheistic and materialistic. Indeed, the
engraving depicting God at the beginning of Buffon’s Natural History was considered to
be a hypocritical gesture intended to fool the Sorbonne’s theologians. (See Figure 2.)9
Buffon drew quite deliberately on his Roman predecessor. The first words of the
Histoire naturelle were not his, but Pliny’s: “Res ardua vetustis novitatem dare, novis
auctoritatem, obsoletis nitorem, obscuris lucem, fastiditis gratiam, dubiis fidem; omnibus
vero` naturam, & naturae suae omnia [A difficult enterprise it is therefore to make old
things new, to give authority and credit to novelties, to polish and smooth that which is
worn and out of use, to set a gloss and luster upon that which is dim and dark, to grace
and countenance things disdained, to procure belief to matters doubtful, and in one word,
to reduce nature to all, and all to their own nature].” The fact that a modern naturalist
began his book with a reference to a Roman writer might be regarded as merely a standard
declaration of allegiance to the ancients. But this reference can also be read with a more
critical eye, for the same quotation occurred in the opening of another contemporary book,
Andre´-Franc¸ois Boureau-Deslandes’s Histoire critique de la philosophie.10 Strikingly,
both projects drew on the very same text: the new history of philosophy and the new
natural history both stood under Pliny’s protection. In using this quotation, both writers
Historie of the World and into French as Histoire du monde. See Caius Plinius Secundus, L’Histoire du monde
de Pline Second, le tout mis en franc¸ais par Antoine du Pinet, 2 vols. (Lyon: Cl. Senneton, 1566); and Pliny, The
Historie of the World Commonly Called the Naturall Historie of C. Plinius Secundus, Translated into English
by Philemon Holland, Doctor in Physicks, 2 vols. (London: Adam Islip, 1601). Claude Duret, Histoire admirable
des plantes (Paris: Nicolas Buon, 1605), p. v, referred in his preface to Pliny’s “Histoire universelle.”
8 Noe¨l-Antoine Pluche, Le spectacle de la nature, ou Entretiens sur les particularite´s de l’Histoire naturelle,
qui ont paru les plus propres a` rendre les jeunes gens curieux, et a` leur former l’esprit, 9 vols. (Paris: Veuve
Estienne et Jean Desaint, 1732–1750). Pluche’s Spectacle ranks fourth in Daniel Mornet’s survey of private
library catalogues (it was present in 206 libraries), behind Pierre Bayle’s Dictionnaire historique et critique (288
occurrences), Cle´ment Marot’s Oeuvres (252), and Buffon’s Histoire naturelle (220). See Daniel Mornet, “Les
enseignements des bibliothe`ques prive´es (1750–1780),” Revue d’Histoire Litte´raire de la France, 1910,
17:449–496, on p. 460.
9 See Lelarge de Lignac, Lettres a` un Ame´riquain sur l’Histoire naturelle (cit. n. 5), first letter, Vol. 1, pp.
94–95; and Thierry Hoquet, Buffon illustre´: Les gravures de l’Histoire naturelle (1749–1767) (Paris: E´ ditions
du Muse´um National d’Histoire Naturelle, Collection Archives, 2007), pp. 155–159.
10 See Pliny, Historie of the World (cit. n. 7), “The Preface or Epistle Dedicatorie to Prince Vespasian,” n.p.;
and Andre´-Franc¸ois Boureau-Deslandes, Histoire critique de la philosophie, ou` l’on traite de son origine, de ses
progre`s, et des diverses re´volutions qui lui sont arrive´es jusqu’a` notre temps, 4 vols. (Amsterdam: F. Changuion,
1737–1756), Vol. 1, pp. vi–vii.
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meant to alert their readers to the fact that they were trying to present new content in old
trappings. Both were aiming to provide a new philosophy.
The problem facing Buffon was that natural history, confined to the mere collection of
data, lacked ambition. Notwithstanding the book’s title, the avowed goal of Buffon’s
Histoire naturelle was to present a real natural philosophy; he simply refused “to limit its
ambitions merely to exact descriptions.” In fact, according to Buffon, natural history must
try “to raise itself to something greater” and, more particularly, “to open roads in order to
perfect the various parts of physique.”11 Buffon’s conception of natural history therefore
considered the gathering of facts to be only a preliminary step toward attaining a higher
11 Buffon, “Premier discours: De la manie`re d’e´tudier et de traiter l’histoire naturelle,” in Histoire naturelle,
Vol. 1 (1749), pp. 50–51.
Figure 2. Buffon: God creating the world? © Buffon, Histoire naturelle ge´ne´rale et particulie`re
(Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1749), Volume 1. In 1751, Lelarge de Lignac’s Lettres a` un Ame´riquain
attacked Buffon’s “bonne physique” for telling the story of the creation of the universe without
referring to the Creator. According to Lignac, there is a discrepancy between Buffon’s text and the
plate situated at the beginning of “The Formation of the Planets”—a drawing by Nicholas Blakey
(?–1758), an Irishman living in Paris, engraved by Fessard.
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level of generality. His work was really an attempt to produce the true physique—or at
least to provide his successors with the certain means to achieve it.
This objective of establishing a true philosophical physique could be derived from the
tension at play between the philosophical and the historical. Buffon praised Aristotle and
Pliny for their philosophical spirits. In Aristotle, Buffon acknowledged “a certain twist in
the ideas, that [he] would willingly call his philosophical character,” and in Pliny, “a
certain freedom of mind, a boldness in thinking which is the seed of philosophy.”
Therefore, the two masters of ancient science were both credited as creators or anticipators
of a philosophical kind of project. Buffon bewailed the fact that, among his contempo-
raries, “philosophy is neglected.”12 However, if this was the case, and if Buffon wanted to
set natural history on a higher level, closer to what was commonly understood as natural
philosophy, why did he not entitle his work Natural Philosophy instead of the old-
fashioned (and indeed thoroughly abused) Natural History?
In fact, Buffon’s Histoire naturelle was an attempt to redefine the term “history.”
Throughout the monographs devoted to various animals, Buffon attacked earlier uses of
the word, deploring, for instance, that this part of science had never been carefully studied
before: “the works, the older as well as the newer ones, bearing the title of History of the
Birds contain almost nothing historical.”13 In this context, the goal of history was very
clear: it should tell us what the species actually do. History was thus the “moral” part of
science, having to do with mores (moeurs, habits). The problem of birds’ interbreeding
was historical insofar as it explained who mated with whom. It was a behavioral question,
just like many others: we have “to figure out what our swallows do while in Africa and
our quails while in Barbaria” or “get some information on the habits of the birds in China
or in the Monomotapa.”14 Description attended to the animal’s anatomical dimensions,
detailing the measurements of the body’s various parts; but the proper concern of history
had to do with the “moral” aspects of the life of a species—namely, its habits.
This was therefore a first important reason why Buffon chose to call his book a “natural
history.” When Buffon was urging his contemporaries to write the natural history of birds,
he was in fact exhorting them to observe animals and collect facts about their ways of
living. Thus “facts will multiply, our knowledge will grow and our historical attempt, of
which we could sketch only the first lines, will more and more be filled and will gain in
solidity [prendra plus de corps].”15 In Buffon’s Histoire naturelle, history was a method
(induction from facts to laws) and a field for new inquiries (regarding ethological or
behavioral matters).
PHYSIQUE WITHOUT MATHEMATICS, BUFFON WITHOUT NEWTON
In Buffon’s time, natural history was as much a division of knowledge as a specific
method for studying nature. It was a science dealing with naturalia that used specific
procedures such as the collection of data. As a division of philosophy, natural history
could be identified with the true physique—a point that Buffon’s Histoire naturelle made
particularly clear. Because his aim was “to perfect different parts of physique,” he
12 Ibid., pp. 48, 52.
13 Buffon, “Plan de l’ouvrage,” in Histoire naturelle, Vol. 16 (1770), pp. v, xxiii (emphasis added).
14 Ibid., p. xxiv. Addressing the first question had an anti-Linnaean impact because Linnaeus had written
(following others, like Olau¨s Magnus) that swallows hid in the swamps during the winter. See Philippe Gue´neau
de Montbeillard, “Les hirondelles,” in Histoire naturelle, Vol. 21 (1779), pp. 558–559.
15 Buffon, “Plan de l’ouvrage,” p. xxiv.
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constantly turned to physical causes or reasons. He also criticized several authors (such as
Johann Jakob Scheuchzer and John Woodward) for confusing physique with theology or
metaphysics.16
The physique he had in mind, Buffon argued, would not take a mathematical shape.
According to the “Premier discours,” mathematical demonstrations had their own ways of
proving propositions or reaching truth. If this knowledge was susceptible to being applied
to some restricted fields in physique, it still did not imply a universal model to which all
scientific discourse had to conform. This position could be considered a type of Epicurean
or Aristotelian critique of mathematics. After all, Buffon considered mathematics to be
constructed through abstraction (i.e., separation), turning material objects into mere
“objects of thoughts.” This implied a distinction between two different kinds of truths:
mathematical truths, albeit self-evident, were only in our minds; whereas physical truths,
while only “probable” or “certain,” were nonetheless the guarantors of a “real” science.
By way of example, he explained that the mathematician demonstrated with complete
“obviousness (e´vidence),” whereas the physicien gathered facts, and on that factual basis
he built hypothetical truths that would reach a degree of infinite probability that Buffon
called “certitude.” According to Buffon—here following the Dutch physicist Willem
Jacob s’Gravesande (1688–1742)—what mathematics gained in e´vidence, it lost in
re´alite´. Mathematical and physical truths belonged to two different fields. Mathematics
was a science of definition, moving in a conceptual environment full of idealizations. In
contrast, physical truth did not need to be demonstrated by means of axioms and chains
of propositions.17
Mathematical truths were nothing but “des ve´rite´s de de´finitions,” simple but abstract
combinations of ideas, repeating the content of the definition in different words, whereas
physical truths rested on the secure basis of facts. Mathematical truths were “des identite´s
d’ide´es,” without any claim to reality—mere suppositions logically deduced from the
original hypothesis. Physical truths, in contrast, did not rely on human deduction; they
depended on the repetition of the same events. Their essence consisted of an “uninter-
rupted succession of the same events.” “In mathematics, one supposes; in physique, one
poses and establishes; there, there are definitions; here, there are facts; one goes from
definition to definition in the abstract sciences; one proceeds from observation to obser-
vation in the real sciences. In the first case one arrives at e´vidence, whereas we reach
certitude in the latter. The word ‘truth’ includes those two meanings.”18
If we are to understand the meaning of “physique” in the Buffonian context, we have
to return to the structure of French institutions and, most conspicuously, to the division of
the Acade´mie Royale des Sciences into two different classes: mathematics and physique.
Christiaan Huygens first instituted this division at the end of the seventeenth century in the
Acade´mie’s original statutes, and it lasted until the marquis de Condorcet’s reform in
1785.19 Huygens recommended that the two classes meet on different days (Wednesday
16 See Buffon, “Premier discours,” in Histoire naturelle, Vol. 1, pp. 50–51; and Buffon, “Article V: Exposition
de quelques autres systems,” ibid., p. 197. The general index in Vol. 15 (1765) reveals Buffon’s insistence on
physique throughout the Histoire naturelle.
17 See Willem Jacob s’Gravesande, Discours sur l’e´vidence (1724), in E´ le´ments de physique de´montre´s
mathe´matiquement et confirme´s par des expe´riences, trans. E´ lie de Joncourt, 2 vols. (Leyden: Langerak &
Verbeek, 1746). A statement like “Pierre vit aujourd’hui” provided certain, albeit unnecessary, knowledge (its
contrary was possible). On s’Gravesande’s possible impact on Buffon see Thierry Hoquet, Buffon: Histoire
naturelle et philosophie (Paris: Champion, 2005), pp. 299–306.
18 Buffon, “Premier discours,” in Histoire naturelle, Vol. 1, p. 54.
19 See Christiaan Huygens, Oeuvres comple`tes, Vol. 19 (1937), rpt. ed. (Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger,
38 HISTORY WITHOUT TIME
and Saturday, respectively). If this strict division faded away over time, historians of the
Acade´mie have emphasized that there nonetheless remained a rather nonporous boundary
between the mathematical and the physical sections, one that very few scientists crossed.20
Taking this division into account helps in clarifying that, in Buffon’s time, pursuing the
true physical system did not mean working in a mathematical manner. Buffon’s Histoire
naturelle was a kind of nonmathematical treatise of physique. In the context of the
Parisian institutions of science, it served to harden the difference between the two classes
of the Acade´mie des Sciences somewhat. At least, it strongly emphasized that the
distinction between the classes mathe´matiques and classes physiques was not just an
arbitrary matter.
This interpretation—that Buffon’s Histoire naturelle was an attempt to set the foun-
dation for a nonmathematical physique—seems to contradict the historiographical image
of the young Buffon enthusiastically embracing a Newtonian conception of science in the
vanguard of the Parisian scientific scene. Buffon’s reputation as one among the anglophile
avant-garde of scientists who contributed to the introduction of English ideas in France,
and more particularly as one of France’s most distinguished Newtonians, is so entrenched
that his opposition to a mathematical physique (as well as his claims against final causes)
is read as a rhetorical stance or as a contradiction within his system.21 Before I develop an
argument for a nonmathematical physique, Buffon’s relationship with Newton as it
emerges in the Histoire naturelle must be clarified.
Buffon did start his scientific career as a Newtonian. He agreed that science should
search for nature’s laws and that those laws should be as simple and as universal as
possible. Buffon’s strong stance in favor of an orthodox Newtonianism was most obvious
during his academic polemics with Alexis Clairaut. Buffon also published translations of
two English books: Stephen Hales’s Vegetable Staticks (1735) and Newton’s Treatise on
Fluxions (1740). The young man who wrote the prefaces to these books praised the
experimental spirit of the English. But to what extent did these texts in fact express
Buffon’s supposed Newtonian position?
In the preface to La statique des ve´ge´taux, Buffon’s references to Hales himself were
oblique at best. He simply stated that the time he had devoted to the translation sufficiently
demonstrated his interest in the work; he did not need to “expand on the merits of this
book.” (See Figure 3.) The public, Buffon suggested, would distrust the praise of a book
offered by the translator—certainly a very offhand way of paying tribute to the author. In
contrast, Buffon was perfectly willing to highlight the faults he found in Vegetable
Staticks, especially the lack of explicit connections between the facts it put forward. As for
Newton, the praise he received in this preface to Hales’s work amounted to nothing more
than a rather general statement: he was credited for a critique of barren systems and a
complete devotion to observation. The role of mathematics in Newton’s reform of natural
1967), p. 268, point 4, in which the program for the “Assemble´e de physique” was described: “Its main and most
useful occupation will be, in my view, to work on natural history more or less according to Verulamius’s design.
This history consists in experiments and remarks and is the only way to reach knowledge of the causes.” See also
Histoire de l’Acade´mie Royale des Sciences, year 1699 (published 1702), preface. This organization of the
Acade´mie lasted until 1785, after which it was divided into eight different classes (ge´ome´trie, astronomie,
me´canique, physique ge´ne´rale, anatomie, “chimie et me´tallurgie,” “botanique et agriculture,” “histoire naturelle
et mine´ralogie”).
20 Whereas there were numerous cases of promotion between the various classes of each part of the divisions
(for instance, from me´canicien to ge´ome`tre), only three scientists were promoted from a classe de mathe´matiques
to a classe de physique or vice versa: Buffon, Jean-Nicolas de La Hire, and La Condamine.
21 Jeff Loveland, Rhetoric and Natural History: Buffon in Polemical and Literary Context (Oxford: Voltaire
Foundation, 2001).
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philosophy and the lawlike form he gave to his physical principles were not even
mentioned. Buffon clearly praised the experimental spirit in contrast to the esprit de
syste`me. Hales’s book, he asserted, “belongs to an excellent genre, since it is nothing but
experiment [expe´riences] and observation.” If experiment was of such importance, it was
because, “with regard to physique, experiments must be sought as much as systems must
be feared.” The idea of a unique principle that would rule the universe was explicitly given
as an example of what physique should avoid as “vain and fanciful.” And, as Buffon
clearly stated:
Figure 3. Page from Buffon’s translation of Vegetable Staticks. S. Hales, La statique des
ve´ge´taux, et celle des animaux (Paris: De l’Imprimerie de Monsieur, 1779). © MPIWG, Berlin.
Buffon’s 1735 translation of Hales’s Vegetable Staticks is his declaration of allegiance to the true
experimental spirit. Nevertheless, his praise loosely groups Newton together with “Verulam, Galileo,
Boyle, Stahl” and “these gentlemen of the Acade´mie des sciences de Paris.” Simultaneously,
Buffon refuses to “expand on the merits of this book”—a very offhand way of paying tribute to the
author.
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It is not enough, in order to be a Physicist, to know what would happen according to this or that
hypothesis, one postulating, for instance, a subtle matter, vortices, an attraction, etc. It is a
question of being well aware of what does happen, and of knowing well what takes place under
our eyes: the knowledge of the effects will lead us insensibly to that of the causes, and one shall
no longer fall into the absurdities which seem to characterize all systems.22
Oddly enough, attraction was included, together with Cartesian vortices, among the
misleading hypotheses. If Buffon nonetheless praised the method of “the Great Newton,”
it was only under the guise of plain Baconian natural history: “the gathering of heaps of
facts and the avoidance, as much as possible, of any esprit de syste`me, at least until we
are instructed.” If Newton was offered as a methodological model, it was neither for his
use of mathematical reasoning nor for his discovery of the law of attraction but, rather
flatly, for his hypotheses non fingo. Newton was therefore joined in Buffon’s praise by
“Messieurs de Verulam, Galile´e, Boyle, Stahl,” together with the members of the Parisian
Acade´mie des Sciences and, especially, “messieurs Huygens, de Re´aumur, Boerhave,
etc.” Buffon was far from claiming a complete devotion to Newton’s natural philosophy
or from hailing attraction as the key to physique. The idea of a young Buffon first among
the Newtonians lacks textual support in his edition of La statique des ve´ge´taux.23
The case of the preface to Newton’s Fluxions (1740) was a different matter, since it
appeared to be a sign of allegiance both to Newton and to mathematics (in the guise of the
calculus).24 But in fact Buffon’s preface, while acknowledging the perfect clarity of
Newton’s ideas, developed a metaphysical critique of the concept of the infinite that had
been closely tied to the practice of geometry. Buffon asserted that our daily experience (by
means of sensation) is restricted to the limited, the finite—and therefore that the arith-
metical or geometrical infinite had no actual existence. The preface to the Fluxions, far
from being a sign of Buffon’s loyalty to mathematical conceptions of science, instead
stressed the lack of reality of mathematical ideas. Some of these strong statements would
later be developed near the end of the “Premier discours” of the Histoire naturelle.
Buffon’s quarrel with Clairaut over the status of laws in physique illustrated his true
thoughts about Newton. The quarrel encompassed arguments taken from both physique
and metaphysics. If a natural law in physique was confronted with an exception, Buffon
asked, did the law have to be modified in order to cover that particular case? Clairaut
thought that a new term in 1/R4 should be added to the traditional form of the law in 1/R2.
Buffon, in contrast, believed that the law should retain its universal form and that
interfering factors should be sought to explain the apparent exception. For Buffon, every
time the form of a simple law was modified, new forces were in fact added and, implicitly,
were presumed to act. That was why, in the case of astronomical movements, he refused
to modify the law of attraction, in order to avoid the multiplication of “occult principles.”
Nevertheless, Buffon did resort to the possibility of devising new forces in his studies of
the mystery of generation and the reproduction of organic beings.
22 Stephen Hales, La statique des ve´ge´taux et l’analyse de l’air, trans. Georges-Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon
(Paris: Debure l’Aıˆne´, 1735), pp. viii–ix. Phillip Sloan’s translation of this text “Newtonizes” Buffon’s
sentences, because he uses “natural philosophy” for the French word “physique” and “natural philosopher” for
“physicien.” Such translations wrongly emphasize an identity between the two terms, hinting thereby at a close
identification of Buffon with Newton that is otherwise unsupported by the text. See John Lyon and Phillip R.
Sloan, eds., From Natural History to the History of Nature: Readings from Buffon and His Critics (Notre Dame,
Ind.: Univ. Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 38.
23 Hales, Le statique des ve´ge´taux, trans. Buffon, p. vi.
24 Isaac Newton, La me´thode des fluxions et des suites infinies, trans. Georges-Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon
(Paris: De Bure, 1740).
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Buffon’s support of an overall Newtonian cosmography did not imply that he was
thoroughly Newtonian, particularly when he discussed organic beings. In his theory of
generation, the concept of forces pe´ne´trantes was often mixed up with attraction. The
forces pe´ne´trantes and attraction had common features. Most conspicuously, those forces
were not susceptible to perception by the human eye, since they acted on matter three-
dimensionally, whereas human vision only perceives surfaces (bi-dimensional planes).
Yet forces pe´ne´trantes were not attractions. In point of fact, Buffon revised Newton’s
place in the history of mechanics. The key question here is the number of forces operating
in nature: the Aristotelians multiplied forces to excess, whereas the Cartesians restricted
them, with equal vigor, to mere impulsion (forces acting by contact). Newton, however,
enlarged this tight mechanical Cartesian framework and demonstrated that natural forces
other than impulsion could be taken into consideration. This is what Newton means in the
Buffonian history of physique: he is regarded as setting a precedent, as the person who
showed that there was a middle ground between the symmetrical excesses of the Aristo-
telians’ occult qualities and the Cartesians’ narrow mechanics. This does not prove that
Buffon was a Newtonian. In fact, Buffon belongs instead with naturalists of a third type,
which Roger Coˆtes described in the preface to Newton’s Principia mathematica as “those
who admit in philosophy no other rule than experience itself.”25 While both Buffon and
Newton belonged in this category, it did not make a Newtonian of Buffon. As was
commonly noted in the eighteenth century, only sects that were in error kept their leader’s
name: truth did not bear the name of any individual. A true physicist, as Buffon asserted
he was, followed only one master: l’expe´rience.
HISTORY WITHOUT TIME
Buffon’s natural history was a not a mathematical physique, but a historical one. Here we
encounter an important set of traditional claims in the Buffon historiography: namely, that
it is he who introduced time into nature. The temporal interpretation of history may very
well have merit, and his association with it may account for much of Buffon’s reputation
in the early nineteenth century, particularly among figures such as Johann Gottfried
Herder who were trying to think historically. But this status as a forerunner of historicism,
analogous to Buffon’s reputation as a forerunner of evolutionary thinking, should not lead
us to overlook other interpretations of the concept of history, such as nontemporal
epistemological conceptions.
Buffon himself attributed an important role to time, calling it “the great worker in nature
[le grand ouvrier de la nature].”26 It could be argued that the very title of his masterwork
testified to the achievement of introducing time into nature. His contribution to the
epistemic transition from a natural history (understood as a mere description) to an
authentic history of nature (histoire de la nature), understood in a temporal fashion, can
even be documented.27 Time did play an important role in Buffon’s work, and it bore
various meanings: from the cyclical concept we find in the 1749 texts to the more evolving
25 Isaac Newton, Principes mathe´matiques de la philosophie naturelle, trans. Mme. du Chaˆtelet (Paris:
Desaint-Sallant-Lambert, 1759), Vol. 1, p. xxii (quoting Roger Coˆtes).
26 Buffon, “Les animaux sauvages,” in Histoire naturelle, Vol. 6 (1756), p. 60.
27 Note the titles of Lyon and Sloan, eds., From Natural History to the History of Nature (cit. n. 22); Jacques
Roger, “Buffon et l’introduction de l’histoire dans l’histoire naturelle,” in Buffon 88: Actes du colloque pour le
bicentenaire de la mort de Buffon, ed. Jean Gayon (Paris/Lyon: Vrin-IIEE, 1992), pp. 193–205; and Giovanna
Bernardini, “Buffon, la storia della natura e la storia degli uomini,” Studi Settecenteschi, 1986, 4:167–189.
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time in those of 1778, which leaves a place for decay and collapse—a conception that is
sometimes contrasted with Condorcet’s emphasis on progress.28 Buffon’s methodology
has even been characterized as introducing time everywhere—and especially in his
concept of natural species, where his biting criticism of the Linnaean conception (species
as a mere collection of resemblances) led him to a dynamic notion (species as lineages,
producing fecund offspring).29
Obviously, for a dynamic and temporal conception of nature to be achieved, a complete
revolution had to occur in the meaning of the word “history [histoire]” and the expression
“histoire naturelle,” which would become the name of Buffon’s scientific and editorial
enterprise. According to Jacques Roger, addressing the question of time in nature implied
an understanding of the word “history” itself.30 If history was to be understood only as the
science of temporal events (as Roger himself affirmed), then the “history” of nature
amounted to no more than the question of the earth’s age and the origin of life. This was
also the opinion of June Goodfield and Stephen Toulmin, who attempted to show how a
“remarkable feature”—time—was introduced into our framework of nature through the
development of a history of nature.31 This narrative described quite efficiently the sense
in which Buffon contributed to the development of biological theory.
But is there not another meaning of “history”? The temporal meaning of “history”
derives mostly from a nineteenth-century conception, which is not of any help to those
critics interested in understanding what was going on in Buffon’s monumental work.
Perhaps, as John Eddy has argued, Buffon had no sense of time at all and his Histoire
naturelle was not a history but, instead, a nonhistorical or nondevelopmental system.32 It
may be that, in Buffon’s context, a work or a science did not need to be temporal to be
called “history.” In other words, history (at least in the eighteenth-century meaning of the
term) did not require time, nor did time imply history. What we therefore have to
understand is what history was or could have been if it were not “historical” or before it
became so. We must recall that, during Buffon’s era, when a book was called a “history”
it did not rely on time but on other types of requirements—namely, methodological
ones—that have been entirely overlooked in contemporary scholarship.
Eighteenth-century history must be conceptualized in several forms, among which
natural history and civil history are but two examples. History did not deal only with
naturalia or societies. The history of a country, published by European travelers, could be
28 See Hans-Jo¨rg Rheinberger, “Buffon: Zeit, Vera¨nderung und Geschichte,” History and Philosophy of the
Life Sciences, 1990, 12:203–223; and Giovanna Bernardini, “La concezione del tempo nell’Histoire naturelle di
Buffon,” Rendiconti dell’Istituto Lombardo (Classe di Lettere e Scienze Morali e Storiche), 1991, 125:201–213.
29 See Phillip R. Sloan, “Buffon, German Biology, and the Historical Interpretation of Biological Species,”
British Journal for the History of Science, 1979, 12:109–153; Sloan, “From Logical Universals to Historical
Individuals: Buffon’s Idea of Biological Species,” in Histoire du concept d’espe`ce dans les sciences de la vie
(Colloque international, Paris, 1985) (Paris: E´ ditions de la Fondation Singer-Polignac, 1987), pp. 101–140; and
Jean Gayon, “L’individualite´ de l’espe`ce: Une the`se transformiste?” in Buffon 88, ed. Gayon (cit. n. 27), pp.
475–489.
30 Jacques Roger, Pour une histoire des sciences a` part entie`re (Paris: Michel, 1995), p. 201. This position was
a sharp criticism of Michel Foucault’s epistemes (or orders of discourse). Foucault’s Les mots et les choses [The
Order of Things] implemented a pattern of discontinuity between various epistemes. If John Ray belonged to the
classical time, Georges Cuvier belonged to a totally different cultural period, and no bridge could be constructed
between those two epistemes. See Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses: Une arche´ologie des sciences
humaines (Paris: Gallimard, 1966).
31 Goodfield and Toulmin, Discovery of Time (cit. n. 3), p. 17.
32 See John H. Eddy, Jr., “Buffon’s Histoire Naturelle: History? A Critique of Recent Interpretations,” Isis,
1994, 85:644–661.
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a natural history and, at the same time, a moral, ecclesiastical, or political history.33 Such
publications demonstrate that history was understood to be a general method, shared by
different kinds of “historians,” regardless of whether they were studying the animal
kingdom or the British empire. Apart from its temporal meaning, the word “history” had
a special relevance in its methodological meaning of “inquiry” or “description.” History
was a unique science. It was a method of description that could be applied to various fields
or subjects, and the question of time had little or nothing to do with it.34
Without taking for granted the supposedly necessary relationship between “natural
history” and time, we might ask why Buffon wrote a book with “history” in the title if he
did not intend to introduce time into the study of nature. There were, in the eighteenth
century, at least two very definite and much discussed concepts of (natural) history. The
first was the Baconian version, in which natural history worked together with natural
philosophy. It had to do with the collection of well-established facts and was a preliminary
step in the process of science. This was a very popular concept, as the many book titles
that used the phrase—such as Robert Plot’s Natural History of Oxfordshire and Erich
Pontoppidan’s Natural History of Norway—suggest.35 More particularly, the concept of
history as the collection of facts had a profound impact on eighteenth-century thought. It
was evident in Franc¸ois Boissier de Sauvages’s 1772 treatise and, as late as 1787, in
Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, where the “historical” was opposed to the
“mathematical” or “rational.”36
The second conception of history was appropriated from the civil historians, especially
from scholars like Nicolas Fre´ret (1688–1749), a member of the Acade´mie Royale des
Inscriptions et des Belles Lettres. For them, history was the paragon of a nonmathematical
science, which had to rid itself of the methodological requirements of mathematics—
namely, step-by-step demonstrations proceeding from definitions. As seen from this
perspective, history thus became the epistemological model of a nonmathematical science,
where knowledge relied on another kind of truth: the gathering and careful examination
of “monuments” or records.
Buffon’s Natural History actually drew from two different conceptions of history. The
first was connected with the natural sciences and indicated a more or less nonsystematic
collection of data. The other came from the civil historians and implied a nonmathematical
way of acquiring certainty through the search for specific evidence. In both cases,
33 See, e.g., Jose´ de Acosta, De natura novi orbis (1589), trans. in R. Regnault, Histoire naturelle et morale
des Indes tant orientales qu’occidentales (Paris: Marc Orry, 1598); and Engelbert Kaempfer, Histoire naturelle,
civile et eccle´siastique de l’Empire du Japon, 2 vols. (La Haye: P. Gosse & J. Neaulme, 1729).
34 See Foucault, Les mots et les choses (cit. n. 30).
35 See Robert Plot, The Natural History of Oxfordshire, Being an Essay towards the Natural History of
England (1677), 2nd ed. (Oxford/London: Leon Lichfield, 1705); and Erich Pontoppidan, The Natural History
of Norway, Containing a Particular and Accurate Account of the Temperature of the Air, the Different Soils,
Waters, Vegetables, Metals, Minerals, Stones, Beasts, Birds, and Fishes, 2 vols. (London: A. Linde, 1755).
36 According to Boissier de Sauvages, there were only three ways to acquire new knowledge: history,
philosophy, and mathematics. “History is the knowledge of facts,” whereas mathematics was the knowledge of
quantities and measures and philosophy the knowledge of causes and principles. See Franc¸ois Boissier de
Sauvages, Nosologie me´thodique, ou distribution des maladies en classes, genres et espe`ces, suivant l’esprit de
Sydenham et la me´thode des botanistes, trans. from Latin into French by M. Gouvion (Lyon: Jean-Marie Bruyset,
1772), §27. For Kant’s attitude see Immanuel Kant, “Die Architektonik der reinen Vernunft,” in Kritik der reinen
Vernunft, Zweite hin und wieder verbesserte Auflage (Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1787). The translation
by Norman Kemp Smith reads as follows (A836/B864): “all knowledge, subjectively regarded, is either
historical or rational. Historical knowledge is cognitio ex datis; rational knowledge is cognitio ex principiis.”
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, rev. 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2007), p. 655.
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strikingly enough, history had nothing to do with time. Of course, civil historians did
construct chronologies, but the real methodological questions historians dealt with had
more to do with the concept of truth, the meaning of facts, or the authority of testimony.
If Buffon related explicitly to this second conception, defining physique as an epistemo-
logical field distinct from mathematics, he appeared to dismiss the Baconian conception
in his declaration that he was not aiming for the mere collection of facts. His (natural)
history was a true philosophical physique. If history and philosophy of nature bore two
different (and almost contradictory) meanings in the Baconian context, why call a book
“history” when its contents were heavily “philosophical”? In other words, in what sense
could Buffon’s work be said to be “historical”?
The polemical impact of Buffon’s stance was not lost on his contemporaries who were
fighting the rise of heterodox Epicurean ideas in mid-eighteenth-century France. At times
Buffon’s Histoire naturelle was read as an attack against both the mathematical and the
theological physique.
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE BACONIAN CONTEXT: DESCRIPTION AND
COLLECTION VERSUS ALCHEMY?
The Baconian interpretation of the natural scientist’s role urged historians to gather the
fundamental pieces of information that would provide firm grounds for philosophy.37 Even
though Francis Bacon sharply criticized strict or pure empiricists, he maintained that it
was not necessary that natural history respect any kind of order. Indeed, natural history
could even be thought of as a mere “warehouse” of knowledge, the place where raw
materials were collected or “compared,” waiting for the right time to become part of a
construction that would be “physical” insofar as it dealt with nature (phusis). In Bacon’s
own words: “they who shall hereafter take it upon them to write natural history should
bear this continually in mind—that they ought not to consult the pleasure of the reader, no
nor even that utility which may be derived immediately from their narrations; but to seek
out [conquirere] and gather [comparare] together such store and variety of things as may
suffice for the formation of true axioms.” The reform of knowledge required a total
recasting of the existing construction of science. In order to achieve that objective, Bacon
divided the Instauratio magna, his general program for the new science, into six different
sections.38 Natural history occupied the third level and was said to be the real “foundation
of philosophy.” Natural philosophy was the sixth and last part of science, the ultimate goal
or science in action, but Bacon believed it to be out of reach, at least for the time being.
Texts like the Parasceve and the Sylva sylvarum belonged to the level of natural history.
The term “Parasceve” signified the act of making preparations, as on the eve of Shabbat; this
text was aimed at creating a “natural and experimental history such as may serve for the
foundation of a true philosophy.” Natural history must provide raw materials for the latter
37 Francis Bacon, Novum organum, Bk. 1, Aphorism 117, in Works, ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis,
and Douglas Devon Heath (New York/Boston: Hurd & Houghton/Taggard & Thompson, 1861–1864).
38 Francis Bacon, Parasceve ad historiam naturalem et experimentalem, “Aphorismi de conficienda historia
prima,” Aphorism 2, in Works, ed. Spedding et al., Vol. 2, p. 48, Vol. 8, p. 358. The six steps or divisions of
the Baconian program were Division of the Sciences; The New Organon or Directions Concerning the
Interpretation of Nature; Phenomena of the Universe: Natural and Experimental History for the Foundation of
Philosophy; The Ladder of the Intellect; Forerunners or Anticipation of the New Philosophy; and The New
Philosophy, or Active Science. For a careful study of the various styles adopted by Bacon for each of the different
steps of the general scheme of science see James Stephens, Francis Bacon and the Style of Science (Chicago/
London: Univ. Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 112 ff.
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steps of science (and ultimately philosophy) in the same way that forests provided wood
for the carpenter. This was also the reason why the ten “hundreds [centuriae]” of facts that
constituted the first collection of data for natural history bore the title Sylva sylvarum.
“Sylva” was the Latin equivalent of the Greek term “hule`,” the “first matter” on which one
can operate and “inform.”39 In the Parasceve and the Sylva sylvarum Bacon offered a
pattern for historical knowledge: just gather the data, without claiming any sort of
interpretation. History would therefore embody the epistemological idea of submission to
phenomena; it would abandon any attempt to look for causes and stick to the act of
gathering facts. Bacon concluded the Parasceve with a list of 130 histories that would
have to be written (Historia ventorum, Historia vitae et mortis . . .) before the perfect and
complete philosophy could hope to be realized. This meaning of natural history as raw
material epitomized the very “method of Verulamius” for many philosophers.40 On the one
hand, it seemed that, even though Bacon himself did not consider history to be the ultimate
form of science, it constituted a necessary requirement that paved the way to science,
playing a preparatory or even a pedagogical role.
On the other hand, natural philosophy as the correct interpretation of facts was a distant
prospect, which might be achieved only by large communities of researchers working
together with data compiled in books (an historia naturalis ex libris).41 But in the true
Baconian inductive sense, the “correct combination” of facts would automatically emerge
from the collected mass once enough had—finally—been accumulated. Philosophy was
therefore inherent to history.
This was precisely Buffon’s meaning. Though he owed much to the Baconian concep-
tion of history, bringing together civil history and natural history and trying to obtain some
solid facts by way of comparison, Buffon did not restrict natural history to the narrow
Baconian view.42 Instead, he broadened it to the philosophical theory of nature. He
confronted the Baconian pattern insofar as he pretended that he would be able to reach
philosophy. In the preface to his translation of Hales’s Vegetable Staticks Buffon praised
Bacon, among others, in reference to the true method of natural history. He urged
naturalists “always to gather experiments and to step away, if possible, from any spirit of
system, at least until we are learned enough: someday we will surely find a way to order
39 Bacon, Parasceve, “Descriptio Historiae naturalis et experimentalis, qualis sufficiat et sit in ordine ad basin
et fundamenta philosophiae verae,” in Works, ed. Spedding et al., Vol. 2, p. 43, Vol. 8, p. 353. See Lisa Jardine,
Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1974), p. 135: “A
natural history is an uncritical record of observations of natural phenomena, which corresponds to the store in
the memory of primitive sense-perceptions. This means that the observations it contains are to be recorded
without embellishment, without bias, and without supporting citations from classical sources, as concisely and
perspicuously as possible.” See also Paolo Rossi, Francesco Bacone: Dalla magia alla scienza (Bari: Laterza,
1957), p. 51: “La Sylva Sylvarum (una grande foresta che doveva offrire il materiale alle costruzioni future).”
40 Francis Bacon, “Catalogus historiarum particularium secundam capita,” in Works, ed. Spedding et al., Vol.
2, pp. 61–69, Vol. 8, pp. 373–381. Regarding the “method of Verulamius” see, e.g., a letter from Rene´ Descartes
to Marin Mersenne, dated 10 May 1632, asking for a book containing “the history of celestial phenomena
according to the method of Verulam”: Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Cerf,
1913), Vol. 1, p. 251. This referred to what Bacon had described in the fifth chapter of his Descriptio Globi
Intellectualis: Works, ed. Spedding et al., Vol. 7, p. 294, Vol. 10, pp. 410–411.
41 Bacon himself had to acknowledge that he would probably not see the sixth part of the Instauratio magna
completed during his lifespan. See Bacon, Novum Organum, Bk. 1, Aphorism 116, in Works, ed. Spedding et al.
42 On the importance of comparison see Buffon, “Animaux communs aux deux continents,” in Histoire
naturelle, Vol. 9 (1761), pp. 127–128: “With regard to the utility of comparing animals, it is evident that . . . in
examining the notices of foreign animals communicated by travelers, it will enable us to distinguish names and
facts, and to refer each to its proper species; and lastly it will render the history which I am now composing less
defective, and perhaps more conspicuous and complete.”
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this material; but even though we are not fortunate enough to raise the complete building,
this will certainly help us to ground it, and maybe to make more progress than we
expected.” Buffon repeatedly attacked the restricted conception of history as description:
“We should not imagine that, even today, in the study of natural history, one should limit
oneself to the making of exact descriptions and the ascertaining of particular facts.”43
Restricted historical aims may be an appropriate goal for a novice; but experienced
naturalists would not confine themselves to the simple accumulation of facts in the way
Bacon had suggested. Instead, as Buffon put it, the naturalist would be eager “to combine
the observations and to generalize the facts to bind them together by the strength of
analogies; he will struggle to achieve the high degree of knowledge where we can judge
that particular effects are dependent on more general ones, where we can compare nature
to itself in its great operations, and from where we can finally open new roads to perfect
the different parts of physique.”44
This outlook would have important consequences for the qualities required in a
naturalist. Buffon’s conclusion clearly favored the importance of the general issues:
A vast memory, assiduity and attention suffice to arrive at the first end; but more is needed here:
general views, a steady eye, and a way of reasoning informed by reflection much more than by
study; and lastly, this quality of mind is needed, thanks to which we can grasp distant
relationships, bringing them together, and making out of them a body of reasoned ideas, after
having accurately assessed the likeness and weighed their probabilities.45
Despite the praise given to observations, and whatever the importance of isolated facts, the
most important part of science consisted in binding these facts together by means of
analogy. This process alone allowed one to deduce a general effect from a particular one.
Buffon invoked the naturalist’s mind itself as the means of transcending the Baconian
herd’s hamstrung empiricism. “Comparison,” hence, had two different meanings. In the
Baconian warehouse, it referred to the accumulation of observations. In Buffon’s Natural
History, however, comparison was the thread that led the reader out of the maze of
isolated data.
Buffon claimed that he understood Bacon better than the Baconians did, since he sought
to construct a natural philosophy, the interpretation of nature that was the ultimate and
avowed aim of Bacon’s Instauratio. If Bacon had often criticized alchemists, he none-
theless borrowed their terminology to describe his own program as “illumining the
understanding, extracting the axioms, [and] producing numerous useful works [of phi-
losophy].” His criticism thus did not bear on their program itself (separare et extrahere)
but, rather, on the hastiness with which they tried to implement new (and weak or
uncertain) results. Like Giambattista della Porta or Cardanus, who defined man as naturae
minister et interpres, Bacon and his conception of natural history and philosophy were
deeply indebted to the rhetoric of natural magic.46
This may explain why Buffon’s book was not entitled Natural Philosophy. During
43 George-Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon, Preface to Vegetable Staticks, in Oeuvres philosophiques, ed.
Piveteau and Fre´chet (cit. n. 6), p. 6; and Buffon, “Premier discours,” in Histoire naturelle, Vol. 1, p. 50.
44 Buffon, “Premier discours,” in Histoire naturelle, Vol. 1, p. 50.
45 Ibid., p. 51.
46 Bacon, Novum Organum, Bk. 1, Aphorism 130, in Works, ed. Spedding et al. (cit. n. 37). On Bacon’s
relationship to alchemy see Rossi, Francesco Bacone (cit. n. 39), Ch. 1: “Le arti meccaniche, la magia, la
scienza”; and Didier Deleule, “Francis Bacon, alchimiste de l’esprit humain,” E´ tudes Philosophiques, 1985, pp.
289–301.
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Bacon’s era the concept of natural philosophy was so tightly intertwined with the concept
of alchemy that it risked coming off as ridiculous: the very concept conjured up quests
such as that for the Lapis Philosophorum (philosopher’s stone). The alchemical resonance
of natural philosophy, an ancient tradition, survived in the eighteenth century as well. In
Johann Ludwig Hannemann’s 1718 Synopsis philosophiae naturalis, the natural philos-
opher was less a man dedicated to observation than an experimenter in search of the Great
Work.47 Newton’s natural philosophy itself probably owed much to his interest in al-
chemy. Even though Newton, in his attempt to reduce “natural philosophy” to its
“mathematical principles,” transformed the meaning of the term, Buffon, who was reject-
ing the mathematical conception of physique, had many other reasons to avoid a title that
resembled or evoked alchemical work.
Moreover, Buffon explicitly referred to this alchemical conception. He held that the
idea of “method” (a complete system of classification) had been the “philosopher’s stone”
sought by naturalists. And today, he argued, they must drop the idea of a “philosophy” in
the alchemical sense maintained by Bacon, for no general method could ever be achieved.
Such a claim discredited the alchemical project.48 The ultimate goal that Bacon had
assigned to natural history (achieving the goal of philosophy) was now considered to be
a pure fancy; it played a merely utopian function. What really mattered was to gather facts
and put them to use as quickly as possible, for that represented the best chance of finding
the right combination. According to Buffon, the quest for the philosopher’s stone led to
only one important result: though they would not find what they were seeking, in the
course of their research naturalists would chance upon many other unexpected facts.49 If
“natural philosophy” had negative connotations (pertaining to alchemy), “natural history”
was a much more neutral term. It enjoyed the good reputation of Baconian and Plinian
solidity and was therefore susceptible to fruitful reinterpretations.
As a new physique that dismissed the Baconian pattern of merely accumulating natural
historical facts, Buffon’s histoire naturelle claimed to be knowledge of the general
features of natural things. As a philosophy, it sought a nonmathematical way, leading from
the scattered atoms of singular facts to the philosopher’s stone of general laws. Restricting
the domain of mathematics to a handful of abstract objects (like the orbits of the planets
or the rays of light), Buffon aimed for a new type of physique, one that was very close to
the spirit of the Cartesian philosophy but nonetheless challenged it. Just as Descartes
referred to his Discours de la me´thode as an introduction to “Geometry, Dioptricks, and
Meteors,” Buffon invited his reader to a careful investigation of the three specific “essays”
of his new method: the theory of the Earth, the formation of the planets, and the generation
of animals. Clearly Buffon was acting as the new Descartes of 1749, setting physique on
a new foundation that was historical rather than mathematical.50
47 See Denis Zacaire, Opuscule tres-excellent, de la vraye philosophie naturelle des metaulx (Lyon: Benoist
Rigaud, 1574); and Johann Ludwig Hannemann, Synopsis philosophiae naturalis sanctioris illustrata (Tu¨bingen:
G. Cotta, 1718). The Journal des Savants (1720) published a very severe review of Hahnemann’s book.
48 Buffon, “Premier discours,” in Histoire naturelle, Vol. 1, p. 13: “one sees clearly that it is impossible to
establish one general system, one perfect method, not only for the whole of natural history, but even for one of
its branches; for, in order to make a system, an arrangement, in a word, a general method, it is necessary that
it includes everything.”
49 Ibid., p. 14.
50 See Hoquet, Buffon (cit. n. 17), pp. 179–184, 345–348.
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HISTORY IN THE TREE OF KNOWLEDGE
In the Syste`me figure´ des connaissances humaines, the Encyclope´die of Denis Diderot and
Jean d’Alembert depicted the tree of the sciences by relating different kinds of knowledge
to diverse faculties of the mind, rather than relating each science to its objects. Three main
scientific branches followed the three principal faculties: reason, memory, and imagina-
tion. All types of history—natural and civil, along with sacred and literary—grew out of
the same branch and therefore shared a common method, resting on memory. History was
the science in which factual records prevailed. Natural history thus involved working with
memory, and so it was disconnected from physique, which constituted the last part of the
sciences of reason. According to this model, physique was closer to mathematics, on
which it in part depended, whereas natural history was condemned to be the blind
accumulation of data, not even close to being a real science.
Buffon endorsed the conception of natural history as a collection of facts in order to
build the philosophy of nature, but, unlike the Encyclopedists, he strongly opposed the
mathematical conception of physique. The fact that natural history had no mathematical
foundation did not constitute valid grounds for debasing it as an illegitimate science.
Implicitly, in Buffon’s view, “history” might be the name of another form of science,
independent from mathematical norms. As a collection of data, history could, in fact, be
the first step to the general knowledge of physical beings. Traditionally, if a science did
not adopt the mathematical method it was scorned in its aspiration to be a science.
D’Alembert and Diderot thus refused to grant natural history legitimacy as the complete
science of natural beings, yet they included mathematics as a full-fledged member of the
natural sciences. Clearly, if every science had to be mathematical in order to fulfill the true
sense of the word, and if natural history amounted only to the collection of facts or, at best,
their description, then natural history was not entitled to be called a science.
Buffon confronted this contention in two different ways. On the one hand, he unbound
natural history from the mere collection of facts and tied it to physique. No longer a
forerunner to science (as it had been in the Baconian framework), natural history was a
science itself. On the other hand, Buffon debunked the pretension of mathematics to be the
right method for physical science. Rather than the organon of science, he judged math-
ematics to be the most abstract and unreal science. What mathematics dealt with was
nothing more than our fantasies or our own ideas. Therefore, according to Buffon,
mathematical physics was no longer the science par excellence. It was the paragon of a
discourse that had lost any sense of reality. In contrast, natural history, being a “science
re´elle,” was “the source of the other physical sciences and the mother of all the arts.”51 It
was characterized in a strong parallel with civil history. Both were grounded on facts, and
together they constituted the complete body of sciences.52 If natural history was the core
science for philosophers, civil history was more helpful to statesmen. History collected
and ordered facts that could not be invented by the human mind. Facts were to the
historical sciences what experience was to everyday life.53 They showed that knowledge
51 Buffon, “Premier discours,” in Histoire naturelle, Vol. 1, pp. 58, 29.
52 Ibid., p. 29: “The sciences might thus be divided into two main classes, which would contain all that is
suitable for a man to know.”
53 Ibid.: “the sole true science is the knowledge of facts, the mind is unable to provide this, and facts are in
the sciences what experience is in the civil life.”
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did not consist of Platonic ideas, Aristotelian forms, or Cartesian substances, but in “the
relations that natural things bear to each other and to us.”54
BUFFON BORROWS FROM THE HISTORIANS
Buffon reintroduced into natural history an epistemological conception of history, under-
stood as a model for description, truth, and resemblances. History was a methodological
framework, expressing the choice of a nonmathematical epistemology. It claimed that
certainty and truth could be reached by collecting monuments and facts, rather than
through the search for axioms, definitions, and demonstrations. History was a method-
ological guide for physique, better than mathematics. For a naturalist, the more historico
was a method more useful than the more geometrico.
Buffon struggled against mathematical imperialism in ways that recall Nicolas Fre´ret’s
demonstration that mathematics did not constitute a universal instrument. La physique,
like les belles lettres, should find its own concepts and criteria for achieving science and
discovering truth. The mere extension of the mathematical spirit to those fields would be
a mistake and would most certainly lead to a complete epistemological failure.55 History
constituted a totally reliable and independent method, even if it reached truths that were
impossible to demonstrate. That Cicero existed and that Caesar defeated Pompey at
Pharsalus were ve´rite´s de faits as certain as any mathematical equation (224).
Drawing on the suggestions of historians, Buffon urged naturalists to distinguish
between several kinds of truths and to make use of historical concepts. The full title of the
“Premier discours,” “De la manie`re d’e´tudier et de traiter l’histoire naturelle,” was typical
of historical and pedagogical treatises.56 If “manie`re” was a word more or less equivalent
to “me´thode,” it was striking that it bore a very close relationship to the method of history.
When Pierre Coste, working on his translation of John Locke’s Essay on Human Under-
standing, had to translate the expression “in this plain, historical method,” he selected
“d’une manie`re claire et historique.”57 Another one of Buffon’s titles, “Les e´poques de la
nature,” drew on the historical concept of “e´poques,” most prominently used by Jacques
Benigne Bossuet in his Histoire universelle. The epochs were defined as determinate
54 Ibid., p. 30.
55 Nicolas Fre´ret, “Re´flexions ge´ne´rales sur l’utilite´ des belles-lettres, et sur les inconve´nients du gouˆt exclusif
qui paraıˆt s’e´tablir en faveur des mathe´matiques et de la physique,” Me´moires de l’Acade´mie Royale des
Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, 1751, 16:11–37, esp. p. 24. Such a clear-cut distinction between the aims and
methods of history and those of mathematics appeared already in Pierre Bayle’s Dictionnaire historique et
critique; see Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique, 4th ed., 4 vols. (Amsterdam/Leyden: Samuel Luchtmans
et al., 1730), “Dissertation qui fut imprime´e . . . sous le titre de Projet d’un Dictionnaire critique a` M. Du
Rondel.”
56 See, e.g., Rene´ de Lucinge, De la manie`re de lire l’histoire (1614), ed. M. J. Heath (Geneva: Droz, 1993);
Charles Rollin, De la manie`re d’enseigner et d’e´tudier les belles-lettres par rapport a` l’esprit et au coeur: Traite´
des e´tudes (1726–1728), translated into English as The Method of Teaching and Studying the Belles Lettres; or,
An Introduction to Languages, Poetry, Rhetoric, History, Moral Philosophy, Physics, &c, 3 vols. (London:
Printed for W. Strahan, J. and F. Rivington, R. Baldwin et al., 1769); and Gabriel de Mably, De la manie`re
d’e´crire l’histoire (1783), in Corpus des oeuvres de philosophie en langue franc¸aise, ed. B. de Negroni (Paris:
Fayard, 1988). A manuscript by Charles-Franc¸ois Houbigant, Pe`re de l’Oratoire, bore the title “De la manie`re
d’e´tudier et d’enseigner les humanite´s” (1720). While this text remained unpublished, it was widely dispersed
among scholars (Houbigant taught in the College de Juilly, where Montesquieu studied).
57 John Locke, Essai philosophique concernant l’entendement humain, trans. Pierre Coste (1690; 5th
ed.,1755), ed. E´ . Naert (Paris: Vrin, 1994), “Avant-propos,” §2. The conjunction of the words “method” and
“historical” in the same sentence prompted Coste to use the French equivalent “manie`re,” whereas in the margin
of §3 “method” was simply translated as “me´thode” (“Me´thode que l’on y observe”).
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stances or points of view, from which the mind could encompass huge chapters of the
history of mankind.58
The most important concept Buffon transferred from civil to natural history was that of
“monuments.” A monument was not just an architectural building but any kind of remains
from the past that preserved a memory of events.59 In a famous passage in his “Epoques,”
Buffon opened his reflections with reminders of several perplexing facts: the presence of
“elephants” in the frigid North; the widely reported presence of seashells on the highest
mountaintops. Buffon referred to both as “monuments,” objects indicating the earth’s
former states.60 He was not the first either to borrow the concept of monuments from civil
historians or to make use of it in a naturalistic context. A very important category of
natural monuments, the petrified seashells, had been termed “reliquiae Diluvii” (“remains
of the Flood”) by several physico-theologians, like Scheuchzer and Bourguet.61 (See
Figure 4.) Did this mean that Buffon bound the Book of Nature and the Holy Scriptures
together? No; Buffon’s method or “way of comparison” excluded God from the natural
sciences. He had translated a theological concept into a physical one. In Buffon’s theory,
monuments had nothing to do with divine revelation. They were just a way of acquiring
certainty through factual evidence. They provided historians with irrefutable knowledge,
similar to the way demonstrations did in mathematics.
HISTORY, CIVIL AND NATURAL: CROSS-DETERMINATIONS OF THE TWO LEGISLATIONS
Buffon rethought the relationship between physique and mathematics, thereby challenging
the classical arbre des sciences. The opposition to mathematics that he shared with civil
historians explained why both types of history coalesced into a common methodology,
referring to collections of “monuments.” Neither Fre´ret nor Buffon would have subscribed
to Kant’s celebrated axiom, according to which “in every branch of natural science there
is only as much science proper as there is mathematics therein.” But more than that, in
binding natural history to civil history Buffon ignored another strong Kantian dichotomy:
namely, that between man and nature. His “Epochs” opened with a very strong method-
ological statement:
As in civil history we consult deeds, seek for coins, or decipher antique inscriptions in order
to determine the epochs of human revolutions and fix the date of moral events; so, in natural
history, we must search the archives of the world, recover old monuments from the bowels of
58 See Jacques Benigne Bossuet, Discours sur l’histoire universelle a` Monseigneur le Dauphin (Paris:
Se´bastien Mabre-Cramoisy, 1681), in which each epoch was named after a man, allowing the historian to survey
a definite period of time: e.g., “Adam, or the Creation,” and “Noe, or the Deluge.”
59 See Bernard de Montfaucon, L’antiquite´ explique´e et repre´sente´e en figures (Paris: F. Delaulne et al., 1719);
and Abbe´ Anselme, “Des monuments qui ont supple´e´ au de´faut de l’e´criture, et servi de me´moires aux premiers
historiens,” Me´moires de Litte´rature Tire´s des Registres de l’Acade´mie Royale des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres,
1711–1717, 4:380–399, 1718–1725, 6:1–13.
60 See, e.g., Buffon, “Second discours: Histoire et the´orie de la terre,” in Histoire naturelle, Vol. 1, pp.
611–612: “It must however, be acknowledged, that . . . the shortage of historical monuments deprives us of the
knowledge of facts.” See also Buffon, “E´ poques de la nature,” in Histoire naturelle, Vol. 34 (1778), p. 165:
“When comparing those ancient monuments, from the first ages of living nature, with its actual productions . . .”
61 This tradition would be prolonged into the nineteenth century. See William Buckland, Reliquiae diluvianae;
or, Observations on the Organic Remains Contained in Caves, Fissures, and Diluvial Gravel and on Other
Geological Phenomena Attesting the Action of an Universal Deluge, 2nd ed. (London: J. Murray, 1824).
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the earth, collect their fragmentary remains, and gather into one body of evidence all the signs
of physical change which may enable us to look back upon the different ages of nature.62
Buffon unified nature and society through the concept of history, natural and civil, and he
viewed their relationship in what we might describe as a non-Kantian manner. This
62 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgru¨nde der Naturwissenschaft (Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch,
1786), quotation from Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, trans. E. B. Bax (London, 1883),
Preface, p. 140; and Buffon, “E´ poques de la nature,” in Histoire naturelle, Vol. 34, p. 1.
Figure 4. “Reliquiae Diluvianae.” Johann Jacob Scheuchzer, Physique sacre´e, ou Histoire
naturelle de la Bible (Amsterdam: Schenk, 1731–1737), Volume 1, Plate 57. © MPIWG, Berlin. In
the tradition of natural theology, fish fossils and shells were thought to be “remains of the Flood.”
In fact, many aspects of the natural world, such as the existence of mountains, were interpreted as
“monuments” or evidence of the sacred history of nature.
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process of cross-determination humanized the natural sciences and naturalized the human
sciences. Buffon worked at a level prior to any dichotomy between society and nature or
the moral and the physical. The concept of monuments enabled him to regard nature and
society together, in a way very similar to Montesquieu’s contemporary attempt in De
l’esprit des lois (1748).63
A closer examination may be helpful. Montesquieu’s conception of the law made no
distinction between civil and natural laws: “Laws, in their most general signification, are
the necessary relations [rapports ne´cessaires] arising from the nature of things.” This
definition showed that every law was not an essence but a “necessary relation” that had
to be produced. The law “arises” (de´rive) and could therefore be considered as the result
of a process, not as a principle: during its “arising,” or “derivation,” various factors could
interfere and affect the result. In other words, if laws arose, then legislators could
transform them. Knowing this, Montesquieu, in a Baconian fashion, developed a sort of
“legal technology”: knowledge of the process necessarily gave people the ability to
interact with the law. As a developing relationship among various factors, law was not
atemporal and intangible: it was always and nothing but the product of a system of
constraints. Considering these points, Montesquieu could not isolate civil laws from other
types of regulation and legislation: “all beings have their laws”—from the Almighty
Creator to the tiniest creature, from “physical” bodies to “moral” entities. This meant
nothing more than that there were different kinds of relations between different creatures—
beasts, mankind, and angels (“intelligences superior to man”).64 Even God acted in
observance of the constant rules of his being.
Buffon’s method of studying nature (looking for monuments and archives), like Mon-
tesquieu’s way of analyzing the system of the laws, could be understood as a form of
Spinozian treatment of phenomena. In Chapter 7 of his Tractatus theologico-politicus,
Spinoza declared: “For the method of interpreting Scripture is not different from the
method of interpreting Nature, and is in fact in complete accord with it.” The model that
Spinoza described here was precisely a conception of history: “For the method of
interpreting nature consists essentially in composing a detailed study of nature from
which, as being the source of our assured data, we can deduce the definitions of the things
of Nature.”65 In the same manner, the interpretation of nature, of laws, or of Divine
Scripture had to rest on the solid ground of firm data and principles.
BUFFON AND THE EPICUREAN REDUCTION OF THE MORAL TO PHYSIQUE
Buffon’s move toward civil history shared a feature with physico-theology and providen-
tialism: they all used the concept of “monuments.” Buffon referred to the very same fact
(namely, the presence of seashells on mountaintops) that had been interpreted by Wood-
ward and Scheuchzer as proof of the biblical universal Flood. Far from reproducing the
theological argument, however, Buffon offered a new interpretation of this fact. Buffon’s
63 See Peter Hanns Reill, “Vitalizing Nature and Naturalizing the Humanities in the Late Eighteenth Century,”
Studies in Eighteenth Century Culture, 1999, 28:361–381; Reill, Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment
(Berkeley/Los Angeles: Univ. California Press, 2005); and Francine Markovits, “Althusser et Montesquieu,” in
Althusser philosophe, ed. Pierre Raymond (Paris: Presses Univ. France, 1997), pp. 31–74.
64 Charles Secondat, baron de la Bre`de et de Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois (1748), Bk. 1, Ch. 1: “Des lois,
dans le rapport qu’elles ont avec les divers eˆtres.”
65 Baruch Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus (Hamburg: Apud Heinricum Ku¨nraht, 1670), trans. Samuel
Shirley (Leiden/New York: Brill, 1989), Ch. 7: “On the Interpretation of Scripture,” p. 141.
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monuments were not to be confused with reliquiae diluvianae: rather, they belonged to an
Epicurean constellation of theses. Seashells, in short, took on a radically different meaning
in a different context.66 Unfettered by the theological model of the Book of Nature (written
in mathematical signs that had to be deciphered), Buffon’s conception of natural history
involved a historical habit of posing questions in terms of archives and documents.
Because of his physical theories Buffon was accused of Epicureanism. Lelarge de
Lignac coined the term “Anti-Polignac” to describe the first volumes of the Histoire
naturelle, in reference to Cardinal Polignac’s 1748 book Anti-Lucretius.67 (See Figure 5.)
The play of the double negatives cast Buffon as a vindicator of Lucretius. He was
therefore accused of giving new strength to religion’s opponents, the Epicureans. Al-
66 This was a characteristic ploy in libertine writings. See Olivier Bloch, “La technique du collage dans la
tradition libertine et clandestine,” La Lettre Clandestine, 2000, 9:127–142.
67 Melchior, Cardinal de Polignac, L’Anti-Lucre`ce: Poe`me sur la religion naturelle, trans. Jean-Pierre
Bougainville, 2 vols. (Paris: H. & J. Gue´rin, 1749); and Lelarge de Lignac, Lettres a` un Ame´riquain (cit. n. 5).
Figure 5. Polignac’s Anti-Lucre`ce. M. de Polignac, Anti-Lucretius, sive de Deo et Natura (Lipsiae:
C. Breitkopf, 1748). © MPIWG, Berlin. Melchior de Polignac (1661–1741), a follower of Bossuet at
the Acade´mie Franc¸aise, was also a member of the Acade´mie des Sciences and the Acade´mie
Royale des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres. He dedicated thousands of verses to a refutation of
Epicureanism (Anti-Lucretius), which was published after his death by the abbe´ de Rothelin and
translated into French in 1749 by Jean-Pierre de Bougainville, Perpetual Secretary of the Acade´mie
Royale des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres. Buffon’s first volumes of the Histoire naturelle were
published the same year, and Lelarge de Lignac called him “the Anti-Polignac.”
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though “Epicureanism” could have various meanings, in a polemical setting it became an
accusation. It described a physical theory that led to atheism, insofar as every phenomenon
was reduced to its merely physical or material dimension. It also meant that all sciences
were reduced to physique (or natural history), the source from which they had sprung. The
core of this philosophy—Epicurean physics—put forward an antiteleological atomism
within which chance played a critical role in the emergence of (new life) forms.
On the most general level, Epicureanism challenged the idea of Providence. More
specifically, it questioned two different varieties of teleology: the overall external (Pla-
tonic) teleology and the internal (Aristotelian) one. Providentialism, the system opposed
to Epicureanism, entailed a universal Logos that ordered everything for the best. The
providentialist perspective held that we can infer the existence of God from the observa-
tion of various natural beings. It led to what Kant, in critical terms, called a “physico-
theological proof” of God’s existence. Epicureanism confronted this view, arguing that
nature was not synonymous with pure beauty, wisdom, or perfect economy. The existence
of harmony was nothing more than the unexpected effect of disruptive breaks, the result
of the counteraction of various opposing forces. Buffon was Epicurean in the sense that
he pictured nature in a state of continual ruptures of balance, of permanent flow: “Nature,
I allow, is in a perpetual state of fluctuation: but it is enough for man to seize her in his
own age, and to look backward and forward, in order to discover her former condition, and
what future appearance she may probably assume.” This attitude was clearly demonstrated
in Buffon’s natural history of “The Hare.” This section of the Histoire contained several
remarks about the hare’s reproductive power and the way different factors were balanced
in nature with the help of human intervention. There were simultaneously at work great
forces for creation or increase and great forces for destruction—or, as Buffon put it
instead, forces “to alter and undo, to develop and to renew,” since “creation and destruc-
tion are the attributes of [God’s] omnipotence.”68
Epicureanism also confronted internal teleology, the idea of organisms as coherent
wholes designed by a Summus Artifex. During the early modern era it was popularly
asserted that tossing a complete set of individual letters in the air could not produce the
Iliad. The implied analogy suggested that in both cases there had to be an organizing
intelligence at work. In the natural history of “The Hog, the Hog of Siam, and the Wild
Boar” Buffon undermined this thesis. As Samuel Butler phrased it, “the presence of
rudimentary organs under a pig’s hoof suggests an attack upon the doctrine of final causes
in so far as it pretended that every part of every animal or plant was specially designed
with a view to the wants of the animal or plant itself once and for ever throughout all
time.” Buffon opined that “everything which is not so hostile as to destroy, everything that
can subsist in connection with other things, does actually subsist: And, perhaps, in most
beings, there are fewer relative, useful, or necessary parts, than those which are indiffer-
ent, useless, or redundant.” Nature’s plenitude covered everything possible; “it would
appear that everything that can be, is [il semble que tout ce qui peut eˆtre, est].”69 (See
Figure 6.)
The Epicurean world was active, full of elements whose combinations actually pro-
68 Buffon, “Animaux communs aux deux continents,” in Histoire naturelle, Vol. 9, p. 127; Buffon, “Le lie`vre,”
ibid., Vol. 6, p. 252; and Buffon, “Premie`re vue,” ibid., Vol. 12 (1764), p. iv.
69 Butler, Evolution, Old and New (cit. n. 3), p. 85; Buffon, “Le cochon, le cochon de Siam, et le sanglier,”
in Histoire naturelle, Vol. 5 (1755), p. 104; and Buffon, “Premier discours,” in Buffon, Histoire naturelle, Vol.
1, p. 11.
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duced novelty, whereas according to the providentialist perspective the world stayed
passive, without any true generation, because God’s wisdom had foreseen, once and for
all, each and every production among the creatures. Epicurean physique made up every
single being via combinations of numbers of various microscopic parts, whereas provi-
dentialism emphasized essences and substances. Buffon’s conception of nature lay some-
where in between: it was Epicurean with its flow of “organic molecules,” yet essentialist
with its “moules inte´rieurs” defining the species and integrating the molecules into shape.
Buffon could relate to the Epicurean view of composition in several ways. His con-
ception of mathematics as an unreal set of abstract ideas could certainly be ascribed to
Epicurean sources. His theory of the formation of individual bodies ambiguously implied
both the organization of thousands of minute particles (the organic molecules) and the
presence of an eternal form (the moules inte´rieurs). His theory of the origins of the Earth
pointed to an explicitly antiteleological pattern, expelling God from the system and calling
him a hypothesis that had to be avoided. In place of God, Buffon resorted to the hypothesis
of a physical agent—a comet—ruled by a physical force—attraction. And in Buffon’s day
attraction was very likely to be read as a new version of Epicurean chance. Modern
atheists no longer referred to chance, the way the ancients had, but instead referred to
nature’s laws. In parallel to physico-theological interpretations by William Derham and
the like, the Newtonian cosmology, too, was suspected of Epicureanism because it implied
Figure 6. Buffon’s hog and hare. Buffon, “Le verrat,” Histoire naturelle, Volume 5 (1755), Plate 16;
“Le vie`vre,” Volume 6 (1756), Plate 38. © Gallica, Bibliothe`que Nationale de France, Paris. Buffon
constantly uses his monographs on various animals to make general statements about his
conception of nature. In his article on “The Hog,” he claims that “everything that can be, is,”
suggesting that nature produces every possible creature before disposing of the less viable ones—
a cruel process that nonetheless preserves a lot of clumsy beings. In “The Hare,” he reinterprets
the seemingly providential harmony of natural populations in terms of a balance between an excess
of production and an excess of destruction.
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the existence of a vacuum. The laws of nature, traditionally presented by John Ray or
Nicolas Malebranche as proof of God’s perfection or wisdom, were now held to be a
refutation of Providence: their constant activity was a guarantee for the physicist that no
divine guidance was required in the course of natural events. If chance still played a role
in this new materialistic framework, it was to be found in the system’s origins: the blind
source (no Wise Architect) at the origin of the world’s design.70 Around 1750, the word
“Epicureanism” was a way to epitomize and at the same time criticize a so-called atheistic
view of nature and culture, opposing it to the allegedly “true” and providentialist philos-
ophy of the Christian believer. Newtonian cosmology, with its emphasis on the laws of
nature, could be interpreted in either way. The clockwork universe could be praised either
as an indication of the Creator’s wisdom or as the depiction of a mechanical material
device.
If Epicurean philosophy started with a careful study of the laws of matter, it placed
physique at its center. The science of natural beings, which Buffon called natural history,
formed a firm foundation for philosophy, replacing logic or metaphysics, which pointed
to the immaterial soul or to God as the first principle. Hence Buffon’s Histoire naturelle
could be read as a physical theory that refuted the validity of autonomous moral consid-
erations. This theory took several forms. For example, his natural history of mankind, in
considering every fact in both its physical and moral aspects, worked in two different
ways:
(a) Some (physicized) moral beliefs were examined in order to bring them back to their
true (moral) nature. For instance, according to Buffon, virginity was but a product of
human fancy and there was no such thing as a “hymen” in the female anatomy. Natural
history’s role was to identify such so-called organs as mere embodiments of mental or
moral prejudices and then discard them.71
(b) Symmetrically, many “moral” beliefs had to be reinterpreted according to their true
physical nature. Circumcision, for instance, was practiced on religious grounds,
whereas it was rather (according to Buffon) a physical necessity. If they were not
properly circumcised, he held, some men would not be able to mate and generate
offspring.
There was, in fact, a kind of inner contradiction in Buffon’s system. In a very Epicurean
way, he combined the moral and the physical into a single reality; but at the same time,
within this physico-moral whole, he gave priority to one aspect—the physical. In his
Natural History, moral beliefs were reduced to their physical foundations. In other words,
if Buffon was using the term “history” in the sense of a description of the habits of the
various species, his program was actually related to the knowledge of the anatomical parts
and the inner structure of each animal. As he stated in his description of the unau or aı¨:
“in physique, evil is restrained to its most narrow extent.”72 The true physique was the
material one.
70 Charles Secondat, baron de la Bre`de et de Montesquieu, Spicile`ge, in Oeuvres comple`tes, ed. Roger Caillois
(Bibliothe`que de la Ple´iade), 2 vols. (Paris: Gallimard-NRF, 1949–1951), Vol. 2, pp. 1382–1383: “An impious
man said that no man had ever been so crazy as to say that chance had produced the world; that everybody knew
that not even a leaf could be made by means of natural causes or laws. . . . But one can reply: who established
those laws of nature? A blind power.”
71 See Buffon, “De la puberte´,” in Histoire naturelle, Vol. 2 (1749), p. 494. Buffon always refers to the alleged
“hymen” as “caroncules myrtiformes.” This choice of vocabulary allowed him to discard the fanciful goddess
of “virginity.” If there was a physical manifestation of virginity, it was nothing but some fleshy protuberances
and rough patches in the vagina.
72 Buffon, “L’unau ou aı¨,” in Histoire naturelle, Vol. 13 (1765), p. 41.
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Buffon denied any relevance to final causes and reinterpreted the classical topoi of the
moral tradition. Insects, for example, were often taken as a source for political models.
The peaceful kingdom of bees counterbalanced the society of wasps. For Pluche, the
beehive embodied a society where individuals were ready to sacrifice their own good and
interests for the sake of the community, caring for “economy, police, and attention paid
to the work.” Wasps, on the contrary, were depicted as “the pirates and the cannibals of
the flying nation [les boucannie`res ou les anthropophages du peuple mouche],” killing and
robbing like Europeans.73 (See Figure 7.) Buffon stingingly rebuked those moral inter-
pretations. The form of the cells in a beehive was a purely physical phenomenon; it did
not exhibit any intelligence but was the simple result of geometrical constraints, “inde-
pendently of any view, any knowledge, any reflection.”74
This reduction of moral entities to physical relationships was also very clear in Buffon’s
attempt to pave the way for a new metaphysics. He described the body and the soul not
as opposite substances but as mutually comparable entities. In his text On Human Nature,
Buffon clearly presented two opposed ways of knowing the body and the soul. The first,
called the “way of negation” (voie de ne´gation), stated that when someone attributed a
specific feature to one of the substances, he or she must symmetrically attribute the
opposite feature to the second substance. For instance, if one qualified the body as
material, extended, divisible, he would have said nothing about the soul other than that it
was immaterial, unextended, indivisible. This negative logic related to the role played by
“real distinction” in Cartesian metaphysics. It was distinguished from Buffon’s own “way
of comparison.” Comparison was, in fact, the essence of Buffonian metaphysics. It
consisted of attributing positive properties to both sides in a comparison. The soul could
be said to be simple, general, constant, and the body divisible, destructible, extended. The
soul commanded and the body obeyed. The soul could merge with anything; bodies always
73 Pluche, Spectacle de la nature (cit. n. 8), Vol. 1, pp. 130, 142. See Francine Markovits, “Nature et
institutions au XVIIIe sie`cle,” in L’univers philosophique, ed. Andre´ Jacob (Paris: Presses Univ. France, 1989),
pp. 443–454.
74 Buffon, “Discours sur la nature des animaux,” in Histoire naturelle, Vol. 4 (1753), p. 94. This was a claim
that would be taken up in D’Arcy Thompson’s On Growth and Form (1910).
Figure 7. Pluche’s bees and wasps. Noe¨l-Antoine Pluche, Le spectacle de la nature, ou Entretiens
sur les particularite´s de l’Histoire naturelle, qui ont paru les plus propres a` rendre les jeunes gens
curieux, et a` leur former l’esprit (1732–1750). © MPIWG, Berlin. Noe¨l-Antoine Pluche (1688–1761)
was a pedagogue and a popularizer of natural history. His Spectacle ranked among the most
popular books in eighteenth-century private libraries. It spread the spirit of physico-theology to a
large audience. The description of the beehive was a topos of this moral tradition. In more than one
way, Buffon’s Histoire naturelle can be read as the anti-Spectacle: for Buffon, the beehive is ruled
only by mechanical constraints.
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collided with each other and were unable to unite with anything.75 Buffon claimed that his
comparative method produced a much larger array of properties than the negative rea-
soning of traditional Cartesian metaphysics.
COMPARATIVE NATURAL HISTORY AS THE TRUE PHYSIQUE
This Epicurean physique was neither a mathematization nor a deification of nature.
“Nature” remained for Buffon a polysemous term (he finally gave up on contributing the
entry on “Nature” for the Encyclope´die). He subscribed neither to the ideal of an a priori
knowledge of the laws of nature nor to a mathematically founded rational mechanics. The
method that he called “comparison” expressed a natural history that drew from Galilean
and Newtonian quantified physics. Nature, as Buffon described it, was a body of laws, yet
laws did not necessarily take a mathematical guise: they were “general effects,” law-like
relations discovered by way of comparison. In stark Lockean fashion, Buffon’s Natural
History abandoned all contact with substances and real essences.
In Buffon, the laws of nature lacked the Cartesian characteristics of clarity and
distinctness of necessary truths. But the failure of the Cartesian method was a consequence
of the strong belief that the world’s system could be reached by the exclusive operation
of the mind, guided by the principles of logic. Buffon found a way for natural laws, given
both a general form and some reality, to exist between the two symmetrical shoals of the
nebulae of imaginary fancies and the infinite heap of particular facts. The idea of
generality, intrinsically linked to the concept of law, was produced from the repetition and
collection of singular events, which anchored laws in the real world of constant and
concrete phenomena.
History was, in the Buffonian context, an epistemological concept: a specific way to
document science and provide it with a certain kind of evidence, necessarily aiming for
a general (philosophical) end. If it had to be viewed in a temporal fashion, history relied
on describing various e´poques, depicting grands tableaux and attributing a definite order
to the series of events, rather than on the Romantic eschatological scheme of a progressive
development of things. Buffon tried to identify monuments rather than deal with an
indefinite time running through eternity. His experiments on metal globes should be
understood in this perspective: they were instruments for documenting various states of
nature by way of comparison. Buffon’s natural history did not deal with our physical or
biological concepts (time or evolution). On the logical basis of comparison, Buffon built
a relational ontology and rejected the mathematical conception of physique, which
proceeded by proofs, quantifications, and demonstrations. He developed a positive con-
ception of the plurality of truths, involving physical certainties derived from studies of
historical and judicial probabilities. Physique, thus defined, was a science devoted to the
description of the relationships between nature and us, on the one hand, and among
nature’s various productions, on the other. Following neither the path of the mechaniza-
tion of the world picture nor that of the progress of the “quantifying spirit,” eighteenth-
century natural sciences opened a different road.
Linking the judicial to the physical, or drawing a parallel between natural and civil
history (in contrast to Kant, who defined nature and liberty as two different kingdoms),
Buffon, like Montesquieu, does not fit into the Cassirerian perspective of the Enlighten-
75 Buffon, “De la nature de l’homme,” in Histoire naturelle, Vol. 2, pp. 434–435 (way of negation), 435–436
(way of comparison); and Hoquet, Buffon (cit. n. 17), Ch. 16.
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ment. The Histoire naturelle should be understood in light of the materialistic and
Epicurean trends that pervaded the Enlightenment. The Kantian idea of a discontinuity
between nature and culture was not relevant in the thought of those Epicurean philoso-
phers, whose work exemplified the remnant of skeptical or nominalist themes within the
“Enlightenment project.”
Besides, if nature, as a whole, was the body of laws that ruled over interconnected
beings, it expelled moral considerations from the sphere of physical knowledge. Buffon’s
method of comparison stated that no absolute essence standing by itself could be known
or understood; the only things we are able to know must bear a link to us and are therefore
susceptible to comparison. No knowledge could be prior to experience, and therefore
natural history was an atheistic science. Since God was the infinite being, he was in no
way comparable or reducible to finite creatures. And, having no relation to natural
creatures, this incomparable God could not play the role of a causal factor in scientific
explanations—this axiom of incomparability was a replay of Epicurus’s second maxim:
“What cannot be felt is nothing to us.” If the mystery of creation or speculation about the
origins of things was not within science’s legitimate territory, God could be expelled from
physique.
Nonetheless, Buffon did not defend his theory as positively atheistic. He constantly
affirmed that some beings were beyond the reach of human knowledge, warning his fellow
naturalists: Let the Flood be a miracle. Do not try, as Thomas Burnet and William Whiston
did, to explain miracles by physical reasons; and do not try, either, to explain physical
facts by way of miracles. Miracles were what they were: quick interventions of God in the
course of ordinary events. They implied nothing about the physical world, and they left no
traces behind. Miracles were not natural; they did not leave any “monuments”; they were
outside the reach of natural history and should be expelled from la vraie physique.
Contrary to this view, physico-theology stated that God should never be expelled from
any kind of science and that his role could be demonstrated through the course of history
by the collection of monuments. The remains of the Flood, like the first copies of the
apostles’ writings and precious relics of the Holy Cross, had to be recognized and affirmed
by a continuous chain of witnesses. As the early nineteenth-century Oxford geologist
William Buckland expressed it, Christian science had to “throw new light on a period of
much obscurity in the physical history of our globe” and, “by affording the strongest
evidence of an universal deluge,” show that “geology supplies . . . proofs of an event in
the reality of which the truth of the Mosaic records is so materially involved.”76 Buffon,
in contrast, challenged the very possibility of “natural miracles” and of “theological
monuments.” Nothing immanent in this world bore a single trace of a transcendent God,
and natural history should work like civil history. If the collection of facts was the first
step toward a Baconian discovery of natural laws and toward a natural philosophy, then
no divine operation in the course of natural events was to be surmised or sought. Buffon’s
polemical stance can therefore be understood in its full force; there is no need to consider
him a precursor to Darwin or a discoverer of time.
Did this conception of natural history have any impact? If nineteenth-century physicists
did not take this historical, atemporal, and nonmathematical path, Buffon’s concept of the
true physical science was nonetheless not entirely lost to posterity. T. H. Huxley paid great
76 Buckland, Reliquiae diluvianae (cit. n. 61), p. iii. For the role of facts in apologetics see, e.g., Alexandre
Claude Franc¸ois Houtteville, La religion chre´tienne prouve´e par les faits (1722), new ed., 3 vols. (Paris: Le
Mercier & Boudet, 1740).
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tribute to Buffon’s concept of monuments. Ernst Haeckel, though he never actually
mentioned Buffon, also tried to develop the idea of the natural sciences as an intermediate
body of science between the mathematical and the historical sciences.77 Buffon’s blurring
of the severance between history and philosophy might also be echoed in words George
Romanes used to describe Darwin:
While to them [i.e., the predecessors] the discovery or accumulation of facts was an end, to him
it is the means. In their eyes, it was enough that the facts should be discovered and recorded.
In his eyes the value of facts is due to their power of guiding the mind to a further discovery
of principles. And the extraordinary success which attended his work in this respect of
generalization immediately brought natural history into line with the other inductive sciences,
behind which, in this most important of all respects, she has so seriously fallen.78
Buffon can be seen as a good example of the type of “philosophical naturalist” so
important to Darwin’s own conception of science.79 More surprisingly, Buffon’s lay
position, so controversial in his own time, would also be adopted in the following century
as an orthodox conception by Oxbridge dons and other Christian writers like John
Herschel and William Whewell.80 If each philosopher organized the divisions of the
sciences in a specific way, Buffon’s historical conception of physique, both natural and
civil, seems to have paved the way for various interpretations of the relations of science
and religion or nature and society.
77 See Thomas Henry Huxley, “The Rise and Progress of Palaeontology,” in Science and Hebrew Tradition
(London: Macmillan, 1893), essay no. 2; and Ernst Haeckel, Die heutige Entwicklungslehre im Verha¨ltnisse zur
Gesammtwissenschaft (Vortrag in der ersten o¨ffentlichen Sitzung der fu¨nfzigsten Versammlung deutscher
Naturforscher und Aerzte zu Mu¨nchen am 18. September 1877) (Stuttgart: E. Schweizerbart’sche Verlagshand-
lung, 1877).
78 Georges John Romanes, Darwin and After Darwin, an Exposition of the Darwinian Theory and a
Discussion of Post-Darwinian Questions, 3 vols. (London: Longmans, 1892–1897), Vol. 1, p. 5.
79 Phillip Reid Sloan, “The Making of a Philosophical Naturalist,” in The Cambridge Companion to Darwin,
ed. Jonathan Hodge and Gregory Radick (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003), pp. 17–39.
80 As David L. Hull put it, although he did not here refer to Buffon: “What these pious men Herschel, Whewell
and Mill did not perceive was that by removing God as an active agent and relegating him to the position of the
divine author of immutable laws, they were preparing the way for his total expulsion from science. Like Kant’s
Ding an sich, he was becoming remote, obscure, unknowable, somehow underlying everything and very
important, but of no conceivable consequence for any particular scientific investigation.” See Hull, “Charles
Darwin and Nineteenth-Century Philosophies of Science,” in Foundations of Scientific Method: The Nineteenth
Century, ed. Ronald N. Giere and Richard S. Westfall (Bloomington/London: Indiana Univ. Press, 1973), pp.
115–132, on p. 123.
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